PRIVACY, FREE SPEECH & THE GARDEN
GROVE CYBER CAFÉ EXPERIMENT
BRETT STOHS1

ABSTRACT
In response to gang violence at local “cyber cafés,” the City
Council of Garden Grove, California, passed an ordinance
requiring cyber cafés to install video surveillance systems. The
constitutionality of the provision was subsequently challenged, and
a California Court of Appeal determined that the video surveillance
requirement did not violate free speech or privacy protections
under either the federal or California Constitutions. This decision
was immediately challenged, by commentators and a dissenting
judge, as opening the door to Orwellian-type, government
intrusions into individuals’ personal lives. This iBrief analyzes the
appellate court’s decision and concludes that not only did the
majority reach the correct conclusion, but that there is no merit to
the dissent’s Orwellian fears.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
The Internet has become a vital communication and recreation tool
in twenty-first century society; as part of this movement a new model of
commercial dissemination has arisen—cyber cafés. However, the
regulation of these establishments has created conflict between the vital
rights of free speech and privacy, and the need of government to protect
community health and safety. In January 2004, a Court of Appeal for the
State of California handed down the first appellate attempt to balance these
interests—Vo v. City of Garden Grove.2 In the opinion, the court validated
a city ordinance that required cyber cafés to take certain safety measures
aimed at stopping gang violence. One of these safety measures, installing
video surveillance systems capable of recording the physical characteristics
of patrons, was challenged by cyber café owners, who argued that the
ordinance violated patrons’ rights of free speech and privacy. This iBrief
analyzes both the majority and dissenting opinions in light of the federal
right of free speech and California state privacy rights, and concludes not
only that the majority correctly interpreted the law, but that the decision
does not signal the impending Orwellian nightmare suggested by the
dissent.
1
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Cyber Cafés – Not Your Ordinary Cup o’ Joe
¶2
Cyber cafés generally offer networked computers for hire by the
hour.3 Patrons have a variety of Internet applications available to them,
including web surfing, e-mail, and chat rooms.4 Some cafés also provide
office-type applications.5 In Vo, a particular breed of cyber cafés were
becoming prevalent in the City of Garden Grove, California: cafés built
primarily for online gaming and marketed to youth males. These cafés,
known as “PC Bangs” in some Asian countries,6 feature first-person, roleplaying combat games, such as Counterstrike, Doom, and Diablo.7 Patrons
can participate in a networked tournament against other patrons locally, or
even compete against other users worldwide.8 One of the most popular—
and controversial—games is Counterstrike, which vividly depicts violence
and death as terrorists fight counterterrorists.9 Jefferson Graham’s
description of a gaming café adds a little flavor: “[C]onsider the dark
lighting, moody orange walls, upbeat hip-hop music on the stereo and rows
of computers and headphones. Most of the screens display violent game
images of pistols, shotguns, assault rifles and AK-47s decimating terrorists
– and counterterrorists.”10

B. The Garden Grove Experience
In recent years, Southern California has become a hotbed of growth
for cyber cafés that cater to gamers.11 For example, Garden Grove has seen
incredible increases in the number of cyber cafés, growing from three in
¶3

3

See Jefferson Graham, Cybercafes serve an explosive brew, at
http://www.almenconi.com/news/feb02/022502.html (Feb. 25, 2002) (a patron
brings along $5 for a 2 ½ hour visit.). Some cafes are as cheap as 50 cents per
hour, Robert Chacon, Small Business; Cities boot up laws to quell violence at
cyber cafes, BUS. PRESS, Feb. 24, 2003, at 10, available at 2003 WL 8388326.
4
Chacon, supra note 3, at 10.
5
Patrick Vuong, Vanquishing virtual stereotypes, PLACENTIA NEWS-TIMES, Feb.
27, 2003, available at 2003 WL 6988519.
6
Id. (bang is Korean for “room”).
7
Id.; Gretchen Hyman, Violence Breaks out in Los Angeles Cyber Cafes,
SILICONVALLEY.INTERNET.COM, Jan. 3, 2003, at
http://siliconvalley.internet.com/news/article.php/1564001.
8
See Vuong, supra note 5.
9
Paul Wilborn, Cybercafes seek to curb violence, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Mar. 9, 2003, at 27, available at 2003 WL 14982935 (a 14-year-old patron
describes that “[virtual] fighters die regularly in vivid splatters of blood”).
10
Graham, supra note 3.
11
Id.
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1999 to twenty by December 2001.12 Unfortunately, the rise of cyber cafés
in Southern California has been anything but seamless. Outbreaks of
violence have occurred at cyber cafés in different communities, with some
involving gang violence, and even resulting in loss of life.13 In December
2001, the Police Department of Garden Grove issued a report to the City
Council that outlined seven incidents over the course of three months, five
of which involved gang activity.14 These incidents included:
•

November 3, 2001 – inside a cyber café, two patrons
were assaulted by four others with baseball bats and
wrenches.15

•

December 16, 2001 – seven to nine people entered a
cyber café and beat and stabbed a patron.16

•

December 30, 2001 – in a cyber café parking lot, a 20year-old was stabbed to death with a screwdriver.17

The violence in Garden Grove continued in 2002, with a fight among
approximately thirty people in a cyber café parking lot, and the murder of a
14-year-old boy who was leaving a cyber café.18
¶4
The problem of cyber café-related violence has not been confined to
Garden Grove. In December 2002, a PC game-related dispute occurred
outside a cyber café in another area of Southern California. 19 One teenager
was shot in the leg, another suffered a head wound. The brawl included
over one-hundred people, and several teens used chairs and steel pipes as
weapons.20

12

Vo v. City of Garden Grove, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
See, e.g., Chacon, supra note 3, at 10; Hyman, supra note 7; Wilborn, supra
note 9, at 27; Mai Tran, Gang Killing Accomplice is Convicted, LA TIMES, July
17, 2003, at B5, available at 2003 WL 2421138; but see Vuong, supra note 5
(describing the lack of crime in cyber cafés in Placentia, CA).
14
Vo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 262.
15
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2-3, Vo v. City of Garden Grove, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d
257 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (No. G032058).
16
Id.
17
Id. See also Hyman, supra note 7; David Reyes, Garden Grove’s Cyber Café
Laws Get Appeals Court OK, LA TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at B3, available at 2004
WL 55889863.
18
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5-6, Vo v. City of Garden Grove, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d
257 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (No. G032058).
19
Hyman, supra note 7.
20
Id.
13
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Because of these incidents, cyber cafés have gained a reputation as
unsafe. The number of cyber cafés in Garden Grove decreased from
twenty-three in December 2001 to only about half that in July 2003.22
¶5

21

C. The City Council Responds
¶6
Garden Grove first responded to cyber café violence in 2002 by
enacting an emergency interim ordinance that placed a moratorium on new
cyber cafés.23 The City Council then adopted an ordinance regulating the
operations of cyber cafés.24 Five cyber café owners challenged the
ordinance and the city was temporarily enjoined from enforcing it.25 After
the City Council modified the original ordinance with Ordinance 2591, the
regulations at issue in Vo included:

1. A requirement that existing cyber cafés apply for a
conditional use permit.26
2. A curfew for minors forbidding usage of cyber cafés
during school hours or late at night unless
accompanied by a parent or guardian.27
3. Minimum employee staffing requirements.28
4. The required presence of licensed, uniformed security
guards during peak hours on Friday and Saturday
nights.29
5. The maintenance of a video surveillance system that is
capable of showing the activity and physical features
of persons and areas within the premises.30

21

Vuong, supra note 5. See also Johnny Dwyer & Richard Weir, Teen Dies in
Cyberbrawl, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Sept. 30, 2003, at 31, available at 2003
WL 65394863. The problem of gang violence around cyber cafés has not yet
become a nationwide epidemic, but it is not completely confined to Southern
California. For example, there was an incident in Brooklyn, where “a gang of
pipe-wielding thugs” barged into a cyber café and “sparked a brawl that left one
teenager dead and two others injured.” Id.
22
Tran, supra note 13, at B5.
23
Garden Grove, Cal., Ordinance 2556 (Jan. 22, 2002).
24
Garden Grove, Cal., Ordinance 2573 (July 9, 2002).
25
Vo v. City of Garden Grove, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(the temporary restraining order was issued on Aug. 7, 2002).
26
Garden Grove, Cal., Ordinance 2591 (Dec. 10, 2002).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
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In Ordinance 2591, the City Council also made the following findings:
•

A significant number of the patrons of the twenty-three
cyber cafés are minors.31

•

There has been a consistent pattern of violence in and
about cyber cafés since at least September 2001,
posing an immediate threat to the public health and
safety of the community.32

•

There are gang activities at a number of cyber cafés.33

•

The murders of two minors were connected with cyber
cafés.34

•

The enactment of the ordinance will reduce the
potential for criminal activity at cyber cafés.35

¶7
In March 2003, the Orange County Superior Court granted the
plaintiffs’36 request for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the
ordinance.37 The city immediately appealed, and in January 2004, a 2-1
majority of the California Fourth District Court of Appeal reinstated most of
the ordinance provisions, including the video surveillance requirement.38

D. The Ensuing Outcry
¶8
Although the ruling affected only a small number of business
owners and their patrons, some national commentators quickly denounced
the opinion as a significant step backward for individual privacy and
autonomy rights. Anita Ramasastry, an Associate Professor of Law at the
University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, argued that
“[g]overnment-mandated video surveillance of cyber cafes should be seen

31

Id.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Around the time that the City Council passed Ordinance 2591, two plaintiffs
settled their lawsuits with the city and were granted conditional use permits for
their cafés. See Minutes, Garden Grove City Council Meeting 9 (Dec. 10,
2002), available at http://ch.ci.gardengrove.ca.us/internet/pdf/afm/cc/m12102002.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2004). Two
other plaintiffs, including Thanh Thuy Vo, took their case to trial.
37
Vo v. City of Garden Grove, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
38
Id. at 261-62 (the court held that enjoining the conditional use permit
requirement was not an abuse of discretion by the Superior Court). The
plaintiffs did not appeal the decision to the California Supreme Court, and the
deadline to do so has passed. See Cal. Ct. R. 28(e).
32
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as a serious First Amendment issue, one deserving of much stronger legal
scrutiny than it received by the majority [of the court in Vo].”39 Similarly,
an anonymous individual40 posted this comment on the blog of privacy
scholar Lawrence Lessig41:
[The dissent’s] brilliant comments so eerily and poignantly represent
what I view as the ever subtle and continuing trend of American
jurisprudence, compounded by the unsatiable [sic] appetite of the
Court’s perennial accomplice, the Legislature, to persist in eroding the
everyday civil rights of our citizenry, transfering [sic] that power in
real-time into the hands of our myriad institutions. Meanwhile, the
masses cower to the cold comfort of a television set . . . then pat
themselves on the back for the prudent decision to insulate themselves
from the scary world, all the while hailing those political leaders that
would continue to violate their freedom and privacy in the name of
unattainable security.42
¶9
In fact, the Vo decision has already affected how other cities
regulate cyber cafés. Los Angeles recently passed an ordinance similar to
Garden Grove’s, which mandates its thirty local cyber cafés to install video
surveillance systems.43 At a minimum, the Vo ruling may have important
persuasive value in other jurisdictions.
¶10
Therefore, the issue is not only whether the majority in Vo was
correct as a matter of law, but whether the decision signals an erosion of
constitutional rights: Does the Garden Grove cyber café video surveillance
requirement open the door for further government intrusion into citizens’
lives, like Orwellian “telescreens”44?

39

Anita Ramasastry, Can a City Require Surveillance Cameras in Cybercafes
Without Violating the First Amendment?, FINDLAW, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20040219.html (Feb. 19, 2004) (last
visited Oct. 3, 2004).
40
The writer only identified himself as “JA.”
41
Professor of Law at Stanford Law School.
42
Posting of JA to Lessig blog at http://lessig.org/cgi-bin/mt/mtcomments.cgi?entry_id=1709 (Feb. 18, 2004) (last visited Oct. 3, 2004).
43
L.A., Cal., Code §103.101.4 (Am. Legal Publ’g Corp. through Oct. 6, 2004
legislation); Phillip W. Browne, Cafes Get Logged On; New City Rules Go Into
Effect, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 21, 2004, at N3, available at 2004 WL
58348543.
44
See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 6-7 (Signet Classic 1950) (1949) (“The telescreen
received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound that Winston made . . .
would be picked up by it; moreover, so long as he remained within the field of
vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. . .
. You had to live—did live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption
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II. THE MAJORITY SIDES WITH GARDEN GROVE
The Vo court rejected the superior court’s determination that the
video surveillance provision should be enjoined.45 The majority explained
that the requirement: (1) did not unduly infringe any First Amendment right
of free speech, and (2) did not violate a right of privacy guaranteed by the
California Constitution.46 In doing so, the court deferred to the City
Council’s characterization of the Garden Grove cyber cafés as businesses
that tend to attract gang members,47 stating “courts should not too readily
discount the stated need for and justifications expressed by legislative
bodies in support of laws even when those laws incidentally affect First
Amendment rights.”48
¶11

The appellate court reviewed the superior court’s decision de novo
because the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing on the merits turned on a
question of law, rather than fact.49 This de novo review resulted in greater
deference to the legislature than to the lower court, elevating the
legislature’s findings over those made by the lower court.
¶12

A. Free Speech Rights & Narrow Tailoring
¶13
Both the U.S. and California Constitutions protect free speech.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states,

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.50

The California Constitution, however, includes a stronger standard.51
Specifically, Article I, Section 2(a) states:
that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every
movement scrutinized.”).
45
Vo v. City of Garden Grove, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
46
Id. at 276.
47
Id. at 273. In contrast, dissenting Judge Sills dismissed the city’s
characterization, stating that cyber cafés are “the poor man's printing press and
private library.” Id. at 283.
48
Id. at 270 (citing Sundance Saloon, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 261 Cal. Rptr.
841, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)).
49
Id. at 264 (citing Efstratis v. First Northern Bank, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 448
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997) and Ohio v. Barron, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 342, 344 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997)). The court found that a determination of whether a law is facially
constitutional is a question of law. Id.
50
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
51
Gonzales v. Superior Court (City of Santa Paula), 226 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law
may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.52
¶14
The Vo majority began its opinion by stating the general rule that
commercial entrepreneurs must comply with reasonable regulations
promulgated under the state police power even though First Amendment
rights are being exercised on the premises.53 One such reasonable
regulation, a so-called “time, place or manner restriction,” is permitted so
long as it (1) is justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech (“content-neutral”), (2) leaves open ample alternative channels for
communication, and (3) is narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest.54
¶15
Under this test, the central inquiry in Vo was whether the city’s
ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest
because content-neutrality and availability of ample alternative
communication channels were not seriously at issue.55 The test for narrow
tailoring is found in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.56 The Ward Court
explained that a restriction must promote “a substantial government interest
that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”57 While a
time, place or manner restriction may not burden substantially more speech
than necessary to further the governmental interest, the regulation will not
be invalid simply because the interest could have been adequately served by
a less-speech-restrictive alternative.58
¶16
However, the Vo court did not apply this framework directly to the
video surveillance requirement; the court merely held that it was “not
persuaded the video surveillance system affects First Amendment activity
52

Cal. Const. art. I, §2(a).
Vo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 265 (citing Burton v. Municipal Court, 441 P.2d 281
(Cal. 1968)).
54
Id. (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)).
55
See id. at 273.
56
Id. at 265 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
Although the California free speech protections are considered to be stronger
than those granted by the U.S. Constitution, the application of narrow tailoring
to content-neutral restrictions in California follows the same rule as the federal
analysis. See Los Angeles Alliance For Survival v. City of Los Angeles, 993
P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 2000); but see Statesboro Pub. Co., Inc. v. City of Sylvania,
516 S.E.2d 296, 299 (Ga. 1999) (the Georgia Supreme Court interpreted its
constitutional protection of free speech to require its regulations to be narrowly
drawn “to suppress no more speech than is necessary to achieve the city's
goals”).
57
Vo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 265 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
58
Id.
53

2004

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 12

any more than does the presence of an adult employee and/or security
guard.”59 Consequently, the court focused on the staffing and security
guard requirements, attempting to balance them with the harm they were
designed to prevent. The majority’s “tailoring” consisted of the following
arguments:
•

The city had a “substantial interest in public safety.”60

•

The Police Department’s report identified the potential
for gang violence at cyber cafés.61

•

The city reasonably concluded that the presence of two
adults at all times and security guards at peak hours
would advance the city’s interest in public safety.62

•

Absent the regulations, the city’s interest in public
safety and deterring gang violence would be less
effectively served.63

•

The staffing requirements were not broader than
necessary.64

Implicit in the majority’s balancing was a highly deferential attitude
toward the city’s conclusions, especially when contrasted to its posture
toward the findings of the superior court.65 Most notably, the Vo court did
not consider dispositive the fact that only three of the twenty-two cyber
cafés had experienced gang-related violence. In Section V of this iBrief, the
issue of deference is considered in greater depth with regard to the dissent’s
counter to this argument.
¶17

B. Right of Privacy & the Hill Test
¶18
The second issue in Vo was the right to privacy under the California
Constitution. Article I, Section 1 states,

All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty,
59

Id. at 275.
Id. at 273.
61
Id.
62
See id. at 274 (“Absent the requirements of . . . a security guard during high
volume hours, the city’s interest in public safety and deterring gang violence
would be less effectively served.”).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
See id. (citing City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 210
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995)) (“Where ordinances are concerned, it is not the business of
the court to write the statute.”).
60
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acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.66

The phrase “and privacy” was added to the constitution through a ballot
initiative in 1972.67 The California privacy right has been interpreted to
provide protection that is distinct from, and often greater than, the privacy
protection provided by the U.S. Constitution.68 Therefore, the privacy
analysis in Vo focused exclusively on the grant of privacy protection found
in the California Constitution.
The standard for establishing an invasion of privacy comes from
Hill v. NCAA.69 Hill dealt with an NCAA drug testing program that
required random drug testing of college athletes competing in postseason
championships and football bowl games.70 Athletes testing positive were
subject to disqualification from the sporting event.71 The Hill court
explained that a plaintiff alleging an invasion of privacy must show each of
three factors: (1) a legally protected privacy interest, (2) a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the circumstances, which is an objective
entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted community
norms, and (3) conduct by the defendant constituting a serious invasion of
privacy.72 For the first factor, the California Supreme Court identified only
two classes of “legally recognized privacy interests”:
¶19

•

Informational privacy: “interests in precluding the
dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential
information.”73

•

Autonomy privacy: “interests in making intimate
personal decisions or conducting personal activities
without observation, intrusion, or interference.”74

The court continued that, although the drug testing program implicated
legally protected privacy interests,75 the nature of collegiate athletics and

66

Cal. Const. art I, § 1 (emphasis added).
Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994).
68
See generally id. at 641-44.
69
865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
70
Id. at 637.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 657 (emphasis added).
73
Id. at 654.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 658 (noting that the observation of urination implicated autonomy
privacy and the disclosure of medical information implicated informational
privacy).
67
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provisions for advance notice and informed consent all weighed against any
reasonable expectation of privacy.76
¶20
Applying Hill, the Vo court summarily rejected the plaintiffs’
privacy claim, citing the inadequacy of their brief, which only made
“general references” to privacy cases.77 The brief cited only one case,
White v. Davis,78 in which the California Supreme Court first examined
California’s recently adopted right to privacy.79 In addition, the brief did
not actually make any reasoned argument using White as a basis.80
¶21
However, in the dicta that followed, the Vo majority stated that even
if the privacy claim was not waived, the plaintiffs would have failed to
establish a claim on all three elements of the Hill test.81 First, the court
stated that there was no legally protected privacy interest, finding that
because the video surveillance system was only required to record a
person’s physical features, which are not confidential information, the
interest was not one of informational privacy.82 The court also quickly
rejected any autonomy privacy argument, stating that simply observing
persons using computers in a cyber café cannot reasonably be understood to
involve an intrusion upon an intimate personal decision.83 Second, the
majority declared that a reasonable expectation of privacy was “wholly
lacking,” citing the “near ubiquitous use of video surveillance” in other
retail establishments and even in some public places, like road
intersections.84 Finally, the court stated that the plaintiffs presented no
evidence that the invasion of privacy was serious.85
¶22
Since the plaintiffs did not meet any of the three requirements
outlined in Hill, the majority did not engage in an explicit balancing test
apart from the one employed under the freedom of speech analysis.86

76

Id. at 658-59.
Vo v. City of Garden Grove, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(citing the rule in People v. Stanley, that “a brief must contain reasoned
argument and legal authority to support its contentions, or the court may treat
the argument as waived,” 897 P.2d 481, 497 (Cal. 1995)).
78
533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975).
79
Respondents’ Brief at 20-22, Vo v. City of Garden Grove, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (No. G032058).
80
Id.
81
Vo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 276-77.
82
Id. at 277.
83
Id. (adding in footnote 15, “[p]eople don’t do things ‘fundamental to personal
autonomy’ in a public retail establishment”).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
See id. at 276-79.
77
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Although this view commanded a majority, it resulted in an animate dissent
by Judge Sills.

III. THE DISSENTER’S RESPONSE
A. Soft Judicial Whispers
¶23

Judge Sills’ dissenting opinion angrily lashed out at the majority:
The majority opinion represents a sad day in the history of civil
liberties. They see no infringement on privacy when a video camera
is, literally, looking over your shoulder while you are surfing the
Internet. . . . This is the way Constitutional rights are lost. Not in the
thunder of a tyrant’s edict, but in the soft judicial whispers of
deference.87

In addition, Judge Sills expressed the view that the use of video surveillance
measures as a reasonable method for deterring gang violence was an
unconscionable concept:
[T]he essence of their opinion is nothing less than almost slavish
deference to an unsupported and illogical conclusion of the city’s
police chief and city council.
Do my colleagues not realize the – there is no other word for it –
Orwellian implications of their ruling today? They approve an
ordinance which literally forces a “Big Brother” style telescreen to
look over one’s shoulder while accessing the Internet.88

B. Merging Privacy and Expression
¶24
The schism between the majority and dissent is whether the video
surveillance equipment implicated a privacy interest. Unlike the majority,
which compartmentalized its discussion into separate free speech and
privacy analyses,89 the dissent merged the two into a single privacy
interest.90 The dissent argued that because a privacy interest was implicated
the court should have engaged in some level of balancing, either under
“compelling state interest”91 or a general balancing test.92

87

Id. at 286 (Sills, J., dissenting).
Id. at 279.
89
Id. at 275-26 (free speech); id. at 276-77 (privacy).
90
Id. at 279-84.
91
Id. at 280-82.
92
Id. at 282-83.
88
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1. Untangling Hill from White v. Davis
¶25
The dissent’s idea to merge privacy and expression came from
White v. Davis. The dissent, citing Hill’s discussion of White, stated that for
“government action impacting freedom of expression and association,” the
correct standard of review is one of “compelling state interest.”93
White involved allegations of a covert intelligence gathering
operation at UCLA, where members of the Los Angeles Police Department
registered as college students and posed as “secret informers and
undercover agents” to collect information from class discussions and
organization meetings.94 The White court held that the taxpayer-funded
program presumptively violated both the federal and state constitutional
protections of free speech and expression95 and constituted a prima facie
violation of the state constitutional right to privacy.96 In both its free speech
and privacy holdings, the court in White used “compelling interest” as the
standard to judge whether the state action was permissible.97 It was this
merger of free speech and privacy infringement that the dissent in Vo cited
as authoritative.98
¶26

2. The Existence of a Protected Privacy Right & the Appropriate Standard
¶27
In applying the rules from Hill, the dissent stated that the free
speech implications of the surveillance system required that the issue be
analyzed using the compelling interest standard.99 Specifically, Judge Sills
saw cyber cafés very differently than the Garden Grove City Council and
the majority did. He stated:
Cyber cafés allow people who cannot afford computers (or, often, who
cannot afford very high speed internet connections) the freedom of the
press. They can post messages to the whole world, and, in theory (if
they get enough “hits”) can reach more people than read the hard copy
of the New York Times every morning. . . . With the Internet, the
average computer blogger has, in effect, his or her own printing press
to reach the world. . . . Logging on is an exercise of free speech.100

The implication of this declaration is that exercising free speech in a cyber
café is not only a protected privacy interest, but one serious enough that
infringing upon it requires a compelling state interest.
93

Id. at 280.
White, 533 P.2d 222, 225 (Cal. 1975).
95
Id. at 232.
96
Id. at 234.
97
Id. at 232, 234.
98
Vo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 280 (Sills, J., dissenting).
99
Id. at 279.
100
Id. at 281.
94
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In the alternative, Judge Sills argued that even if the privacy interest
at stake did not require a compelling state interest, Hill requires a general
balancing test, and, under such a test, the City Council’s actions still went
too far.101 He explained that the majority had not engaged in any balancing
because it merely deferred to the legislature: “A court cannot just turn over
to the city the balancing under the guise that it does not want to “reweigh”
the evidence.”102 Had the majority balanced, the dissent argued, they would
have realized that the blanket video surveillance requirement for all cyber
cafés was overbroad because only three of twenty-two had experienced
gang violence103 and no surrounding cities had reported any gang violence
at cyber cafés.104
¶28

3. Protection of One’s Identity?
¶29
Judge Sills took his argument one step further and contested that a
person has an expectation of privacy in one’s identity when using a cyber
café.105 He analogized the City Council’s actions with those of Communist
governments, such as Vietnam and China. These countries have cracked
down on access to cyber cafés in recent years by, among other things,
forcing patrons to divulge their identities which, according to Judge Sills,
has stifled the ability of their citizens to freely exchange ideas.106
¶30
Judge Sills further rejected the majority’s notion that a video
camera is no different than a security guard: “A security guard is usually
some guy standing around looking bored. A video camera is a permanent
record of events, accessible to the police with a proper search warrant.”107
The majority responded that the record of events was to be destroyed after
72 hours.108
¶31
Therefore, the essence of Judge Sills’ merger of speech and privacy
is the ability for individuals to keep their identities private.
Communicating with an Internet-ready computer may include written or
real-time communication that is analogous to using a printing press.
Because a camera’s recording of patrons’ features may lead to the
determination of their identities, video surveillance stifles a user’s ability to
anonymously communicate their ideas over the Internet.
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Id. at 282.
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 284 (citing the City Council’s survey of surrounding communities).
105
Id. at 282.
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Id. at 281-82.
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In addition, with the legally protected privacy interest in free
expression, a reasonable expectation of privacy as to one’s identity, and an
inferred serious invasion of privacy,109 the dissent argues a privacy interest
was implicated by Garden Grove’s video surveillance provisions.110 Since
the City Council’s actions did not meet either the compelling state interest
or general balancing standards, the video surveillance requirement violated,
per se, the California Constitutional right of privacy.111
¶32

IV. ANALYSIS
Three conclusions can be made about the Vo case. First, the
plaintiffs did not make a viable freedom of speech claim. Second, the
majority correctly ignored the balancing test requirement because the
plaintiffs failed to establish even a single prong of the Hill test. Lastly,
although this case may be a step backward in individual privacy, it is a very
small step, one that hardly justifies the dissent’s callous rebuke of the
majority and the City Council.
¶33

A. No Freedom of Speech Infringement
¶34
The plaintiff’s freedom of speech claim is the simplest to refute.
Although the burden is on the proponent of the ordinance to show that it is a
valid time, place or manner restriction on free speech,112 it is clear that the
city did not run afoul of free speech rights independent of privacy. First, the
ordinance was content-neutral since it affected all speech taking place in a
cyber café regardless of its content. Second, there are plenty of alternative
channels for communicating over the Internet, such as personal computers
at home, work, school, or public libraries.

The third inquiry, narrow tailoring, is the only element reasonably
at issue. According to Ward, the regulation need not be the alternative that
is least restrictive to free speech, but only one that “promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation.”113 Commentators (generally begrudgingly) describe the Ward
analysis as toothless;114 that it “does not look to how the government has
¶35
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Note that the dissent does not reference this language directly or make an
explicit claim that such an injury has taken place.
110
See Vo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 281-82 (Sills, J., dissenting).
111
Id. at 282-83.
112
Id. at 265 (a time, place or manner restriction on free speech must be (1)
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech (“contentneutral”), (2) leave open ample alternative channels for communication, and (3)
be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.).
113
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
114
See, e.g., Carney R. Shegerian, A Sign of the Times: The United States
Supreme Court Effectively Abolishes the Narrowly Tailored Requirement for
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chosen to regulate the time, place or manner of the protected speech . . . it
only examines whether the government’s substantial interest is being
furthered.”115
Given the low threshold the city was required to meet, it is
understandable that the dissent tried to characterize the ordinance as “an
unsupported and illogical conclusion” by the city;116 to do otherwise would
require acknowledgement that the city’s regulation furthers its general
interest in public safety by potentially deterring violence occurring in and
around cyber cafés. As the city’s findings showed, there were a growing
number of incidents occurring in or near cyber cafés.117 The city acted on
the heels of two high-profile murders occurring outside cyber cafés.118
Patrons who might consider using violence will now be forced to think
twice knowing that their presence will be captured on film. Because the
city has a substantial interest in public safety and that interest would be less
effectively achieved absent the regulation, the city easily meets its limited
narrow tailoring burden.
¶36

B. No Illegal Privacy Infringement
The more interesting debate centers on the issue of whether the
patrons of cyber cafés have a “protected privacy interest” at stake. As a
legal matter, the question is whether surveillance in cyber cafés met the
three-pronged test of Hill.119 The majority’s analysis, although minimal,
correctly dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.
¶37

1. No Legally Protected Privacy Interest
¶38
While the dissent argued that the court must use either (1) the
compelling interest standard or (2) a balancing test,120 the majority claimed
that because there is no legally protected privacy interest, there was no

Time, Place and Manner Restrictions, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453, 489-91
(1992); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1249, 1262-63 (1995).
115
Shegerian, supra note 114, at 490.
116
Vo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 279.
117
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Vo v. City of Garden Grove, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d
257 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (No. G032058).
118
Id. at 3-6.
119
Infra ¶¶ 19-21 (a legally protected privacy interest, a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the circumstances, and conduct by defendant constituting a serious
invasion of privacy).
120
Vo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 279.
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interest to balance.121 Therefore, the threshold question is whether there
was a privacy interest that is protected by law. Considering the two sets of
privacy interests previously identified by court decisions (informational and
autonomy),122 neither seems infringed upon by cyber café video
surveillance. The majority correctly noted the obvious, that “[p]eople don’t
do things ‘fundamental to personal autonomy’ in a public retail
establishment.”123 As a result, strict scrutiny does not apply in this case.124
¶39
For a balancing test to apply, there must be a privacy interest “less
central, or in bona fide dispute.”125 The history of the California Privacy
Initiative itself sheds some light on informational privacy:

[T]he California constitutional right of privacy ‘prevents government
and business interests from [1] collecting and stockpiling unnecessary
information about us and from [2] misusing information gathered for
one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us.’126
¶40
Neither of these occurrences are inexorable results of the Garden
Grove ordinance. All that the provision requires of cyber cafés is that they
maintain a video surveillance system that is capable of showing the
“activity and physical features of persons or areas within the premises,”
keep the videos for 72 hours, and allow the city to inspect the system during
business hours.127 The ordinance does not authorize, nor do the plaintiffs
allege, stockpiling, the misuse of the footage by café owners, or releasing
the footage to any government official absent legal process.128

Furthermore, contrary to what the dissent stated,129 there is no
reason to believe that the ordinance threatened a privacy interest in one’s
identity. Commentator Christopher Slobogin, Professor of Law at the Levin
College of Law, University of Florida, argued that people possess a “right to
¶41
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Id. at 277 (noting in footnote 15, “[w]ithout identifying the privacy interest at
stake, whether an informational interest or an autonomy interest, the balance can
not be struck”).
122
Id.; Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994).
123
Vo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 277.
124
Hill, 865 P.2d 633 at 653.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 654 (citing the Privacy Initiative Ballot Argument).
127
Garden Grove, Cal., Ordinance 2591 (Dec. 10, 2002).
128
Vo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 274-75. In fact, plaintiff’s counsel stipulated that “we
are not required, absent legal process, to turn a tape over to the city under the
terms of this ordinance.” Id.
129
Id. at 282 (“I will go so far as to say that there is an expectation of privacy
even as to one's identity when using a cyber café.”).
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anonymity,” even when in public.130 In the context of government
surveillance of public places, he writes:
Continuous, repeated or recorded government surveillance of our
innocent public activities that are not meant for public consumption is
neither expected nor to be condoned, for it ignores the fundamental
fact that we express private thoughts through conduct as well as
through words.131

However, this argument does not apply to the Garden Grove situation.
First, the surveillance was undertaken by the business owner, not the
government. Any governmental use of the footage required legal process.
Second, unlike the government of Malaysia, who forces all cyber café
customers to register their names and identity cards,132 the ordinance did not
authorize any automatic linkage between patrons and the video footage.133
Patrons could be as anonymous as can be expected in public so long as they
refrain from sharing their personal information with others.134 The
ordinance did not authorize cyber cafés to install any software to record user
behavior or require patrons to identify themselves prior to using a computer.
Therefore, the majority correctly dismissed any need to engage in a
balancing test between individual privacy and government action.
¶42
Finally, the dissent misread White v. Davis in its proposition that
the merging of privacy and free speech in Vo created a protected privacy
interest worthy of a compelling interest standard.135 In Hill, the California
Supreme Court specifically limited the applicability of White v. Davis,
stating that it stands for the proposition that, “some aspects of the state
constitutional right to privacy—those implicating obvious government
action impacting freedom of expression and association—are accompanied
by a ‘compelling state interest’ standard.”136 The Hill court also clarified
that the particular context is key to what sort of balancing the court will
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Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places
and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 217 (2002).
131
Id.
132
Vo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 282.
133
But see Garden Grove, Cal., Ordinance 2573 (Dec. 10, 2002). The original
ordinance passed by the City Council included a provision for a “customer log,”
which was to include patrons’ names, addresses, ages, and computer
assignments, be verified by a governmental agency or educational institution,
and maintained for at least 30 days. Id. That provision was removed by
Ordinance 2591. Garden Grove, Cal., Ordinance 2591 (Dec. 10, 2002).
134
But see Slobogin, supra note 130, at 216 (describing the advent of digital
technology and biometric technology).
135
Vo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 280.
136
Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 653 (Cal. 1994).
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engage in.137 For obvious invasions of interests “fundamental to personal
autonomy,” a compelling interest standard will apply; for other, less central,
or genuinely disputed privacy interests, a general balancing test will be
employed.138 As just discussed, neither category of interest is implicated by
the Garden Grove ordinance.
2. No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
¶43
Cyber café patrons lack a reasonable expectation of privacy. The
situation is analogous to video surveillance in the workplace. In VegaRodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co.,139 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that although an employee had an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in his or her exclusive private office, desk, and file
cabinets, employees do not have a reasonable expectation against
surveillance of open work areas, unenclosed desks, lockers or files.140 Like
these employees, patrons of the cyber café were not given private computer
stations to which they had exclusive use. In fact, a major appeal of cyber
cafés to youth is that they are a place to be with other youth in a common
area to play games, do homework, or surf the Internet.141 The person seated
next to you can see every e-mail written, instant message received, or web
page visited.
¶44
As a practical matter, surveillance has become a fact of life,
resulting in decreased individual privacy expectations:

Cameras are now common in retail establishments to assist in loss
prevention and customer safety. Thus, surveillance cameras
photograph a person who lives and works in a metropolitan area in the
United States an average of twenty times per day. Cameras are found
at intersections, in apartment and office building lobbies, in parking
lots, in stores, in banks, and in elevators.142
¶45
This observation illustrates the flawed circularity of the expectation
of privacy concept. Shaun Spencer argues that this “expectation-driven”
concept of privacy is vulnerable to incremental encroachment.143 Although
137
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Id.
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110 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 1997).
140
Id. at 179.
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See Wilborn, supra note 9, at 27; Vuong, supra note 5.
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Robert D. Bickel, et.al., Seeing Past Privacy: Will the Development and
Application of CCTV and Other Video Security Technology Compromise an
Essential Constitutional Right in a Democracy, or Will the Courts Strike a
Proper Balance?, 33 STETSON L. REV. 299, 305-06 (2003).
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Shaun B. Spencer, Security vs. Privacy, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 519, 521
(2002) (Adjunct Professor at Boston College Law School and Climenko/Thayer
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correct, it does not answer the legal question presented. Rather than trying
to argue that a square peg fits into a round hole, the dissenting judge would
have been better served arguing in favor of rewriting California privacy law.
3. No Serious Invasion of Privacy
¶46
The Vo dissent also erred by inferring the presence of a serious
invasion of privacy. The Hill court stated, “[a]ctionable invasions of
privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual or
potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms
underlying the privacy right.”144 A video surveillance system installed in a
retail business is not an egregious breach of any social norm for the same
reasons underlying the other Hill requirements. Further, requiring cyber
café businesses to install devices that they are already empowered by law to
install on their own accord does not add any new privacy implications.

C. Who Polices the Erosion?
While the Garden Grove ordinance was correctly reinstated, the
question remains whether this is the right result for society. Although
vulnerable to incremental encroachment,145 is it the proper role of the
judiciary to police society’s tendency to overvalue the tangible benefits of
added security in exchange for the intangible losses of abstract privacy
notions?146 There is obviously a balance that society needs to strike; as the
Hill court aptly noted, “[n]o community could function if every intrusion
into the realm of private action, no matter how slight or trivial, gave rise to
a cause of action for invasion of privacy.”147
¶47

The dissent argues that because only three of the twenty-two have
experienced gang-related violence, the government’s interest could have
been realized with “much less intrusiveness.”148 But is it clear that this is
accurate? Requiring cameras at a handful of locations would only tend to
shift the problem to other cyber cafés. Furthermore, while Judge Sills might
believe that cyber cafés are not dangerous per se,149 there is at least
documentation supporting an argument that cybercafés are linked to
violence in cities beyond Garden Grove.150 How much deference should
courts give municipal and state governments to correct their problems?
Forcing the city to make an air-tight connection between all its actions and
¶48
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the harms it seeks to remedy (i.e., that each and every regulated cyber café
has experienced gang violence) seems unnecessarily burdensome on the
city’s ability to solve its problems.
Garden Grove’s requirement of video surveillance in cyber cafés
was a reasonable use of the city’s police power and was rationally related to
its interest in maintaining safety. To argue otherwise is to either take the
position that courts are in a better position to legislate than the politically
accountable City Council, or to argue that the council’s actions were wholly
arbitrary and capricious. While Judge Sills’ contention that courts should
strike down laws based on “slavish deference to an unsupported and
illogical conclusion”151 is valid, the Garden Grove video surveillance
ordinance is not such a law.
¶49

CONCLUSION
¶50
The Vo majority came to the correct result in holding the video
surveillance requirements constitutional under the federal right of free
speech and the California constitutional right of privacy. Although Judge
Sills’ fears of “Big Brother” rearing its ugly head in California certainly
raise an eyebrow, he neglected to recognize that the freedoms of speech and
privacy are not broad enough under current jurisprudence to encompass the
installation of video surveillance in a public retail establishment.
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Vo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 279.

